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Abstract
The problem of addressing dryland salinity at a landscape scale is considered in the
context of using economic incentives to encourage change in land use by individual
landholders to adopt salinity mitigating actions where a public asset of significant
value is threatened.
This paper reviews the principal-agent problem and looks at mechanisms which give
incentives to address natural resource management problems, and in particular, the
role of contracts between the Government and landholders for achieving
environmental objectives. Consideration is then given to the potential for empirical
analysis of these policies in practice and their effectiveness in achieving the desired
environmental outcomes.
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Introduction
Knowledge of dryland salinity, its causes and effects, has increased significantly over
the past twenty years. However, a majority of the options developed to address
dryland salinity are not economically viable for the scale that is required to address
the dryland salinity problem in Western Australia (Kingwell et al., 2003).
Consequently, the State has turned its attention to prioritising funding for salinity
investment to public assets of high value such as natural diversity, water supplies and
infrastructure (DOE, 2003). A change in farming practices and adoption of salinity
mitigating processes is seen as vital for the survival of these assets.
Various policy mechanisms are available to induce change in farming practices, such
as taxes and subsidies, which aim to achieve particular outcomes at minimal cost.
Change in farming practices from traditional forms to those that mitigate dryland
salinity, will be more effective when adopted over a landscape scale. This is because
groundwater flows and other characteristics which contribute to the state of a property
do not recognise its boundaries and often occur on a much wider scale.
This paper aims to look the role of economic instruments in facilitating change in land
use on a landscape scale, in particular, the role of contracts. The role that empirical
analysis plays in verifying economic theory on incentives to induce change in land use
will be considered in the case of revegetation works undertaken in South West
Western Australia.Dryland salinity, coordinating action and economic policy: a role for contracts?
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Dryland salinity: causes and consequences
Causes
Salinity refers to the presence of soluble salts in soil or water at levels which
significantly affect such things as plant growth, soil structure, water quality for
irrigation, industrial or drinking purposes and the breakdown of infrastructure (Peck,
1993; Martin and Metcalfe, 1998). There are two classes of salinity: primary salinity
occurs naturally, where salt has been built up within soil as a result of natural
landscape processes over thousands of years while secondary salinity occurs as a
result of changes in land use management (Peck, 1993).
The State of the Environment (ASEC, 2001) report identifies the common cause of
secondary salinity as being hydrological imbalance. In the case of dryland salinity, the
imbalance can be attributed to the replacement of deep rooted native vegetation with
shallow rooted crops and pastures, such that a greater amount of water percolates into
groundwater systems. Native vegetation cover, through relatively high rates of
transpiration, kept the water table below the root zone. European settlement and
consequent changes in land use to annual crops with low rates of transpiration, have
allowed the water table levels to rise. The implications of this process show
themselves in the form of dryland salinity as the water table adjusts to a new
equilibrium level closer to the surface.
Consequences
Western Australia’s Salinity Strategy (GWA, 2000) estimated that approximately 6.2
million hectares of agricultural and pastoral lands are at risk of developing dryland
salinity in Australia if no action is taken in the next 70 years. Western Australia is the
worst state affected by salinity, with approximately 80 per cent of current national
total area of salinity (NLWRA, 2001). Approximately 7 000 farms, just over half the
farms in the state, and 1.2 million hectares are showing signs of salinity (ABS, 2002).
Costs of dryland salinity include the decline of water quality, hastened breakdown of
infrastructure, loss of productive farming lands and biodiversity. The Western
Australian State of the Environment Report (SERG, 1998) estimated the capital value
of the land lost to salinity at $1.4 billion with a minimum loss of land capital value at
$64 million annually until a new hydrological balance is reached.
Almost all estimates of the costs of salinity do not include the cost to the environment
or cultural heritage. This is particularly pertinent to the Western Australian Wheatbelt,
as it is a world recognised biodiversity hotspot (Myers et al., 2000; Keighery, 2000).
The biodiversity of this region is seriously threatened from dryland salinity, with an
estimated 450 flora species endemic to the lowlands of the Wheatbelt region at risk of
extinction (Keighery, 2000). It has been estimated that up to 80 per cent of vegetation
remnants on farms and up to 50 per cent on public lands (including conservation
reserves) could be lost in Western Australia as a consequence of dryland salinity
(AgWA et al., 1996).
Management options for dryland salinity
Management options identified to address dryland salinity fall under three broad
categories and can be used in various combinations according to appropriateness
(Pannell, 2001):Sally Harvey
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Prevention and protection — of regions at risk from salinity by undertaking native
vegetation retention, adequate resource assessment and water-balance modeling
Remediation — recharge management and interception of fresh water to prevent or
reduce the rate of rise of groundwater, and reduction of groundwater level to reduce
impacts of salt.
Adaptation — managing saline discharge, development of alternative uses of saline
land and water resources.
The severity of the dryland salinity problem has brought together various industries,
non-government organizations, State, Local and Commonwealth Governments under
the National Dryland Salinity Program (NDSP) and more recently, the establishment
of initiatives such as the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP)
and the Cooperative Research Centre for Plant based Management of Dryland Salinity
(CRC). Funding for investment in mitigating the impacts of dryland salinity is
provided for in various government budgets as well as being available through the
NAP, the National Landcare Program and the National Heritage Trust (NHT) fund.
Since its inception in 1989, the National Landcare Program has been successful in
raising awareness of resource conservation and in some cases the change of land
management practices. However, much of the programs efforts have been too small to
prevent ongoing resource degradation and changes in policy approach towards direct
public investments to be targeted and site specific, for assets of outstanding value has
been pursued (DOE, 2003).
Dryland salinity and market failure
The presence of dryland salinity can be described, in economic terms, as a
consequence of market failure. Markets result in the efficient allocation of resources
if, and only if, the prerequisites for a competitive market system are met. Where
prices fail to provide the proper signals to producers and consumers for the efficient
allocation of resources, market failure persists (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1996).
Fundamental causes of market failure in the dryland salinity case include property
rights; externalities and information asymmetries.
Property rights and externalities
Property rights can be defined as the entitlements which govern the way producers
and consumers use resources. In a competitive market economy, private property
rights have the following characteristics:
Universality — all resources are privately owned and all entitlements
completely specified.
Exclusivity — all benefits and costs accrued as a result of owning and using the
resource should accrue to the owner, and only to the owner, either directly or
indirectly by sale to others.
Transferability — all property rights should be transferable from one owner to
another in a voluntary exchange.
Enforceability — property rights should be secure from involuntary seizure or
encroachment by others.Dryland salinity, coordinating action and economic policy: a role for contracts?
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When the characteristic of exclusivity is not present, externalities are likely to occur.
An externality exists when:
… a consumption or production activity has an indirect effect on other consumption or
production activities that is not reflected directly in market prices … the word ‘externality’ is
used because the effects on others (whether benefits or costs) are external to the market
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1996: 590).
As the above definitions suggests, externalities can be either positive or negative, and
as such there will be either an under or over supply of goods being produced or
consumed.
Dryland salinity as non-point source pollution
Negative externalities in environmental situations are often classified as pollution.
Pollution, however, can be classified into two types: fund and stock (Tietenberg,
1996).
Where salt is flushed out of soils and out of water systems at levels not harmful to the
environment it can be considered a fund pollutant. However, rainfall patterns,
physical characteristics and the hydrogeology of the Wheatbelt region in Western
Australia have resulted in the accumulation of salt in soils beyond the absorptive
capacity of the environment and can therefore be classified as a stock pollutant. It has
been estimated that the soils in this region have accumulated between 100 – 15 000
tonnes of salt per hectare (Pannell, 2001).
Pollution can also be categorised into the following sources:
Point source — generally discharges into the environment at a specific location, such
that individual polluters can be identified and observed at a relatively low cost.
Non-point source — usually are dispersed into the environment in an indirect and
diffuse way, consequently the cost of identifying and monitoring individual polluters
is usually prohibitively high.
Mobile source — discharged into the environment from a temporary location.
Dryland salinity may be classified as a non-point source pollutant but whether or not
it is a negative externality will depend on its range. The range of a pollutant can be
classified as local, regional or even global (Tietenberg, 1996). A local pollutant is one
where the damage is experienced near the source of the emission, while damage from
regional pollutants is experienced at greater distances from the source. While a local
pollutant cannot be regional, a regional pollutant may also be local, they are not
mutually exclusive.
These classifications of a pollutant’s range have similarities to classifications of
groundwater flow systems as local, intermediate and regional. Dryland salinity may
prevail as an externality rather than a private cost where groundwater flow systems
encompass more than a single property.
However, an externality can also persist within property boundaries when non-market
and non-use values such as presence of biodiversity and ecosystem functions are
degraded. These costs are borne by the wider community who value their existence.Sally Harvey
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Externalities are not the only source of market failure and this must be kept in mind
when developing appropriate policy to deal with dryland salinity, especially in
targeting assets of high value (Pannell, 2001).
Information asymmetries
The other source of market failure which can be attributed to dryland salinity is
information asymmetry. It is typically defined in a market situation where one agent
(usually the seller) has more information about the good or service which is being
sold than the other (usually the buyer). In agricultural policy studies it is usually
assumed that producers are always better informed about their production process
than the policy makers are, but this is not always the case. Two types of information
asymmetries that occur are:
Hidden knowledge — occurs when the landholder has exact information about
his technology but the regulator or other landholders do not.
Hidden action — is present when only the landholder has exact information on
the conditions under which production activities such as fertiliser and pesticide
applications.
These two types of information asymmetries will often result in the respective
economic problems of adverse selection and moral hazard if not taken into
consideration when designing the regulation mechanism. Adverse selection is often
described in an insurance context where high risk individuals are more likely to buy
insurance than low-risk individuals, and it becomes unprofitable to sell insurance
when it is not possible to distinguish between the two types of individuals. Moral
hazard occurs when an insured party can affect the probability or magnitude of an
event against the occurrence of which it is insured.
Policy instruments available
There are three types of instruments policy makers can use to influence landholder
behaviour: command and control; market based instruments and moral suasion
through education.
Traditionally regulation or command and control approaches usually involve the
setting of some standard against which the ‘regulator’ assesses each firm. In the case
of dryland salinity management in Western Australia, regulations prohibiting the
removal of native vegetation on private property without a permit were put in place
under the Soil and Land Conservation Act. This form of environmental management
requires only information about the parameter being regulated, in this case the area of
vegetation removed.
Market-based instruments are those which use prices and information disclosure to
influence behaviour. Such instruments include: taxes, subsidies, fees, and tradeable
permits. Although generally more efficient than command and control approaches,
they are often not as effective for a number of reasons such as: high information
requirements, high transaction costs and difficulties in defining or establishing private
property rights (Baumol and Oates, 1995).
Moral suasion through education is the third approach used to influence behaviour.
This was the major approach adopted by the government in the decade of Landcare,Dryland salinity, coordinating action and economic policy: a role for contracts?
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using the Landcare Program to educate landholders of the value of revegetation in
addressing land degradation problems such as dryland salinity.
Which policy instruments?
The Western Australian government’s policy to invest in priority assets is looking to
market-based instruments as a means of delivering cost efficient natural resource
management strategies (ASWA, 2002). Examples of market based instruments in
place include:
•  The cost sharing arrangements for revegetation and other conservation activities
being undertaken by the Department of Conservation and Land Management with
landholders in key conservation areas (Mullan and Wallace, 2001).
•  Auctions can be used when information is not complete and were implemented in
Victoria for conservation contracts under the BushTender scheme (Stoneham et
al., 2003).
•  Direct subsidies for schemes to retire agricultural land such as the Environmental
Stewardship, Conservation Reserve and Land Set-aside programs undertaken in
the United States and the European Union (Bourgeon et al, 1995; Wu and
Babcock, 1996).
Some instruments available to government to implement policy goals have attracted
less attention because of the characteristics of the salinity problem (spatial and
temporal dimensions make a tradeable permit system difficult) and also of the
communities targeted to change their land use behaviour, where it may be politically
infeasible to introduce an environmental levy.
In deciding which policy mechanism should be adopted for a particular area for
desired environmental outcomes, each mechanism should be assessed on its:
•  Effectiveness in achieving the outcomes and gaining greater participation, either
by voluntary or compulsory means;
•  Efficiency, it is the least cost method which achieves the desired outcomes;
•  Equity in distribution of costs and benefits for participants, or the political
feasibility of the scheme; and
•  Information requirements of the mechanism, such that the costs of implementing
the scheme do not exceed its benefits.
Some criteria may be given more weight than others. This may occur where
effectiveness is desired above efficiency, where an asset is so highly valued that
whatever means is required to induce a change in behaviour is adopted, regardless of
whether it is the least cost approach. If a scheme is voluntary, it needs to meet the
above criteria and also make those who participate in the program no worse off than if
they had not.
In designing such a mechanism which induces a change in land use, the policy maker
is disadvantaged by hidden knowledge. How much information about farmers should
be known to design an efficient policy mechanism can be analysed as a principal-
agent problem.Sally Harvey
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Principal-Agent problem
The principal-agent relationship consists of a principal who wants to induce another
person, the agent, to take some action which is costly to the agent. The principal may
be unable to directly observe the cost of the action to the agent and has the problem of
designing an incentive payment scheme that induces the agent to take the best action
from the viewpoint of the principal (Varian, 1992).
The principal-agent problem is characterised by hidden action and hidden knowledge,
which was described earlier as an information asymmetry and source of market
failure. However, hidden action is not as important in salinity management as hidden
knowledge as most of the management actions such as surface and deep drains,
perennial pastures, and revegetation are observable at a reasonable cost.
If a policy mechanism has not been designed to account for information asymmetries,
such as hidden knowledge, there is then scope for agents to extract rent from the
principal and reduce the efficiency of the policy. This behaviour is known specifically
as rent seeking. In particular, in offering incentives for change in land use, adverse
selection is likely where land holders will select incentives that are most profitable
rather than those which represent their true cost of land use change. This behaviour
must be considered in the design of the mechanism for the incentive.
The role of contracts in managing dryland salinity
Brousseau and Glachant (2002: i) define a contract as ‘an agreement under which two
parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behaviour to coordinate’. The
economic theory of contracts has developed over the years from the Walrasian market
theory where supply meets demand at a given price, to three principal fields of study
in incentive theory, incomplete contract theory and transaction cost theory. Contracts,
at a theoretical level, provide an analytical framework for a number of issues such as
(Brousseau and Glachant, 2002: 5):
•  The exact nature of difficulties associated with economic coordination;
•  Details of various provisions for coordination: routines, incentives, the authority
principle, means of coercion, conflict resolution, etc;
•  How agents conceptualise the rules and decision making structures that frame
their behaviour; and
•  The evolution of contractual mechanisms.
Moxey et al. (1999) describe how contracts can be used to give incentives to farmers
to produce environmental public goods, and in doing so incur costs in compensating
farmers to change their land use as well as information costs as part of the contracting
process. Given the heterogeneity of farmers production costs and their values, the
information costs involved in negotiating compensation to change their land use is
likely to be substantial if this heterogeneity is not easily observable (hidden
information). Moxey et al. (1999) suggest rather than offering a standard contract to
all farmers, which is inefficient, or negotiating with each farmer, which incurs high
information costs, that a menu of contracts is offered to farmers where they self select
their type, revealing information about their costs.Dryland salinity, coordinating action and economic policy: a role for contracts?
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Collective action
Coordinated management of natural resources can evolve out of collective action,
which has been defined as a movement to address the social dilemma where rational
individual actions can lead to irrational collective actions (Heckathorn, 1996). This is
evident in the problem of dryland salinity, where it is individually rational for a
landholder to replace native vegetation with profitable shallow rooted annual crops
but collectively devastating for the landscape.
The collective action dilemma can be resolved in two ways (Heckathorn, 1996);
1.  In moderate sized groups, it can be resolved through strategic interaction, that
is, the reciprocity of cooperation; or
2.  In larger groups, collective action requires selective incentives.
It is in this second category that there is scope to use contracts to coordinate actions
on a landscape scale by providing incentives in the form of compensation for
undertaking on-ground works to address salinity.
Spatial and temporal information problems
However, the contribution any individual is making to total salinity in a given time
period in a given landscape, is prohibitively unmeasurable, making any contract to
undertake action unverifiable. The difficulties in contracting individual actions to
address a collective non-point source pollution problem have been analysed in
Pushkarskya (2003) and Bystrom and Bromley (1998). Both suggest non-individual
contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, with the former suggesting the
use of a collective subsidy if the collective farmer group is under an ambient pollution
standard set for a watershed, and the latter suggesting the use of a collective penalty if
the farmer group is over the standard. By using a collective incentive scheme, the
information requirement of the regulating authority can be substantially reduced.
Regardless of how the information requirement for contracting is addressed, dryland
salinity is an environmental problem that has inter-temporal considerations that in
some cases may span several decades. Contracts by nature have a defined duration,
over which the agent undertakes some specified actions for some desired outcome at a
specified price. A contract of sufficient length to address dryland salinity would face
numerous problems, including no opportunity to adjust the price to reflect the cost of
mitigation activities as technology develops. Shorter contracts face the problem of
renegotiation, where after the first contract is undertaken the regulator will often have
more information about the farmer’s costs and will try and exploit this knowledge and
reduce the contract price. Laffont and Tirole (1994) describe this as the ratchet effect.
As such, farmers are likely not to renew their contract, which for an environmental
problem requiring a long term approach has potential devastating implications as well
as reducing the value of the initial contract.
Relevant research on the principal-agent problem
There is an extensive literature body on the principal-agent problem, especially in
contracting for environmental problems. There are a few studies which are
particularly relevant.
Programs such as Environmental Stewardship, Conservation Reserve and Land Set-
aside programs undertaken in the United States and the European Union have beenSally Harvey
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analysed under the principal-agent framework, where farmers have private
information about their land quality, for efficient mechanism design (Smith, 1995; Wu
and Babcock, 1996; Bourgeon et al, 1995). Research by Moxey et al. (1999) and
White (2003) addresses hidden knowledge issues through designing contracts which
allow landholders to self select their type.
Krawczyk et al. (2003) devised a system of coupled incentives that stimulates
economic agents to coordinate their actions using a principal-multi-agent game, where
the principal chooses instruments sufficient to generate an environment friendly agent
reaction. A specific coupled incentive scheme is defined where individual agents are
rewarded for their joint actions’ effect rather than their individual accomplishments.
Along similar lines was the paper by Parkhurst et al. (2002) where a voluntary
mechanism of an agglomeration bonus was designed. This scheme is designed to
protect endangered species and biodiversity by reuniting fragmented habitat across
private land. The bonus is an extra payment for every acre a landowner retires that
borders on any other retired acre, on top of the standard payment for retiring any acre
the landowner wishes to retire.
Pushkarskya (2003) and Bystrom and Bromley (1998) address coordinating actions on
a landscape scale by using a collective incentive arrangement to address non-point
source pollution. In Pushkarskya’s study, incentives are given to undertake
management as a group and as such coordinate their efforts rather than acting in
isolation. Hidden information is addressed in that associations consisting of farmers
undertaking pollution mitigating actions, can observe other members within their
region and discern their type and also their actions.
Limitations of this approach include ensuring equitable distribution within
associations according to cost functions, rent seeking activities by members, and free
riding behaviour.
The complexities of dryland salinity in where and when it appears as a consequence
of certain land management practices, makes the application of the above theory on
principal-agent problems difficult and many of the assumptions used are not
applicable. Dryland salinity is a natural resource management problem that has both
spatial and temporal aspects which cannot be modelled in a static setting and should
be considered in a dynamic setting where solutions evolve and adjust to farmers
changing costs in addressing this problem.
Empirical analysis
An empirical analysis is useful to verify the economic theory underlying the use of
contracts. It also identifies the types of mechanisms used to induce coordinated land
management change and observe how implementation was undertaken or is proposed
to be undertaken in the management of dryland salinity.
Existing empirical verification of the economics of contracts can be found in
econometric tests and case studies (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002). Econometric
testing looks at variables such as the duration of the contract and the determinants of
various clauses in contracts. Incentive theory and incomplete contract theory have
assumptions which have made econometric testing difficult. Other obstacles identified
by Brousseau and Glachant (2002) for empirical analysis of contracts include:
gathering data, constructing a database and poor quality of data.Dryland salinity, coordinating action and economic policy: a role for contracts?
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The application of experimental economic techniques, such as Agent-Based
Modelling, can also be used to verify the economic theory being applied to contract
design. This is particularly useful in the absence of data required for econometric
analyses.
A potential empirical analysis of contract theory inducing change in land use to
mitigate salinity would be that of the cost sharing arrangements undertaken in the
Wheatbelt region to protect areas of natural diversity. Cost sharing arrangements
between landholders and the government are generally not formal contracts, such that
they are not legally binding, except in cases where there is a high proportion of
government input (Mullan and Wallace, 2001). Examples of cost sharing schemes
implemented in Western Australia include Bushcare, the Remnant Vegetation
Protection Scheme and the State Revegetation Scheme. The Department of
Conservation and Land Management (CALM) negotiate the terms of the cost sharing
arrangements individually with each farmer participating in a revegetation scheme in
Western Australia. A methodology for cost sharing was developed by CALM to use
for the Dongolocking Project and also at Toolibin Lake and Wallatin Creek (Mullan
and Wallace, 2001).
Incentive schemes to encourage landholder participation in the Catchment
Demonstrative Initiative (CDI) being run by the Government of Western Australia,
the Commonwealth and regional NRM groups provide another opportunity to analyse
the economic theory behind any contracts which are successful at inducing change in
land use. The CDI aims to demonstrate combinations of salinity management
practices to recover saline land restrict its development and allow profitable uses of
saline land and water.
By using the empirical information provided by successful/unsuccessful contracting
arrangements to induce change in land use, contract design can be analysed so that a
future arrangements to induce change in land use may be more cost effective in
mitigating dryland salinity.
Conclusion
Contracts are just one policy mechanism which can be used to address the problem of
dryland salinity at a landscape scale. The context in which they may be appropriate as
an instrument to induce change in land use needs to be investigated further, with
particular reference to empirical analyses where they have already be used in some
form or another, especially where a public asset of significant value is threatened.
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